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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PROF. COFFEE: Good morning, and thank you for coming.
As you know, I missed the last meeting of this body. I was caught
somewhere between here and Tokyo, which is at least a partial excuse.
But I missed it, and it was a loss because over the weekend I read the
transcript of the first session, and I learned a great deal from it. I realized going through the details of punitive damages, the Mastrobuono1 66 case, the six-year rule, and other topics, that there is very
little I can tell you. You know a great deal, and you were very good
last time at presenting clear, concise statements that I think will be
very useful.
However, while I can't tell you more about what you already are
doing, I think what academics can sometimes do is look a little bit
over the horizon and say what issues are creeping up on us-what
issues are about to surface. Then, with those issues in mind, we can
discuss the policy responses that may be appropriate, both today and
tomorrow.
First, while I was in Japan, we had an election in the United States.
It was an election, by the way, that was very hard to explain to the
Japanese, who like certainty and stability. One upshot of that election
is a lot of new legislation that is either pending or likely to be soon
introduced.
One such effort is a draft bill that I have with me drafted by the
House Republicans called the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of
1995.167 I received this bill recently from the General Counsel's office
of the SEC, and it looks like it will receive some serious legislative
attention.
I don't know what will happen to it, but I am using this as a straw in
the wind. One provision in this bill would amend section 21 of the
Securities Exchange Act 1" to add a simple loser-pays provision, 169 the
so-called English Rule, under which the loser must pay, in the case of
166. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 U.S. LEXIS
1820, at *21 (U.S. March 6, 1995), rev'g 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994).
167. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). For a discussion of the bill, see Peter
Passell, Civil Justice System Is Overhaul Target, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 27, 1995, at B7; Richard B. Schmitt, Republican Insurgents Request Wider Legal Reform, Wall St. J., Feb.
15, 1995, at B3.
168. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1992).
169. H.R.10, supra note 167, § 203(a). In a recent speech, however, Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt said that he opposes the loser-pays
rule in securities litigation. See Subcommittee to Hold Another Hearing on Securities
LitigationReform Measure,27 Sec. Reg. & L.Rep. 168 (1995). Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch of Utah, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, also said he
does not support a loser-pays rule. See Paul M. Barrett, Warily, Hatch Mulls Changes
in Civil Justice, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1995, at B1. The United States House of Representatives recently passed a bill that would require someone who brings an unsuccessful lawsuit to pay all of the court costs and legal fees of the defendant if the judge
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any Securities Act or any Securities Exchange Act claim, the prevailing parties' reasonable attorneys' fees plus all of their other expenses.
A similar provision in this bill, by the way, says the same for
diversity
170
litigation, whether or not it raises a Securities Act claim.
A final provision that I particularly want to direct your attention to
would amend and add a new section 39 to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. It is entitled, "The Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act," and it would authorize either side in any action filed
under the Securities Exchange Act to "offer to proceed pursuant to
any voluntary, nonbinding alternative dispute resolution procedure
established or recognized ...17 1 under the rules of the court in which
such action is maintained.'
The other side in the litigation normally would have to respond
within ten days, but the court could stretch the proceeding out ninety
days to identify what kind of alternative dispute resolution procedures
might be employed.
Now, my point here begins with the observation that with the McMahon' 72 case, back in 1987, arbitration suddenly exploded. Securities arbitration went from voluntary to mandatory, and the volume of
arbitration proceedings before the SROs doubled in two years.
Maybe SROs weren't fully prepared for the volume that suddenly hit
them.
Well, with the approaching prospect of two new developments, (1)
the possibility of the English Rule applied to the securities claims and
(2) the possibility that courts will have to start every proceeding that
involves a Securities Exchange Act claim with a discussion of whether
there are available alternative dispute resolution procedures that the
parties can employ, we may again find a substantial migration of cases
to arbitration.
Of course, I recognize that the alternative dispute resolution provision is voluntary, but through their docket control and through their
body language, the courts often can make what is in theory voluntary,
in reality a little bit less than voluntary. We may be at a point where
we are going to see another major quantum leap within the next year
or so in the volume of arbitration, and this raises one of those important questions: Are the SROs going to be able to adjust easily, hitch
their belts up two notches, and vastly increase arbitration?
The other issue that I believe deserves highlighting at the outset
involves not a quantitative issue, but a qualitative one: How much can
one Uniform Code of Arbitration really attempt to do?
deems the suit to have been poorly grounded. Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Bill That
Would Limit Suits of Investors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1995, at Al.
170. H.R. 10, supra note 167, § 101.

171. S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 102(a) (1993).
172. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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This year, in the Salomon litigation,' Judge Patterson of the
Southern District stayed a derivative action proceeding in the Southern District of New York to permit the New York Stock Exchange to
decide if the subject matter of that arbitration, the derivative claim,
was subject to arbitration under the New York Stock Exchange's
rules.
As many of you know, New York Stock Exchange Rule 600(d) excludes from the scope of claims subject to arbitration those submitted
as a class action and claims filed by persons who are members of a
putative class action. 74 Let's call this simply the "class action exclusion provision."
The issue that Judge Patterson decided to stay in deference to the
New York Stock Exchange (and which is on the Exchange's agenda in
the near future) is this one: Is a derivative action sufficiently like a
class action that it should also be excluded, or is it different enough,
because at bottom it is the corporation's claim against its officers that
is being decided, so that it should be covered by the New York Stock
Exchange's arbitration rules?
I don't mean to attempt to decide this case this morning. It is on the
Exchange's agenda. They will look at it in due course. But it is illustrative of my point: There are some very different claims, claims not
involved in classic, "plain vanilla" arbitration of disputes between broker and client, that are now arguably the subject of broker-dealer arbitration agreements.
Without prejudging the issue, I will remind you that Judge Patterson, in his decision, expressed some doubt that the square peg could
fit into the round hole-that is, that derivative litigation could be
melded into an arbitration procedure.
Indeed, defendants as well as plaintiffs may have reason to doubt
that arbitration is adequate to resolve derivative claims without the
process distorting the substance. In a normal derivative action there is
something called the "demand rule" and also the "business judgment
rule." Both of those are very important protections for corporate officers and directors.
In an arbitration proceeding where the arbitrators may examine the
substantive issue from a more equitable perspective, the business
judgment rule, and maybe the demand rule, may get less attention
than they would receive in the Delaware Chancery Court.
In any event, my basic point is that derivative actions, much like the
area of employment discrimination cases, which we'll be talking about
later today, involve very different kinds of substantive claims and possibly very different kinds of procedures than we ordinarily see in arbi173. In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders Sec. Derivative Litig., 91 Civ. 5500, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13874 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1994).
174. NYSE Rules, supra note 14, Rule 600(d), 1 2600.
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tration. Hence, can all these new claims sensibly be resolved within
the tent of one Uniform Code of Arbitration, or, as we look at the
future, will there have to be special little subchapters?
The process of taking a uniform code and making it a little less uniform and adopting special rules for special contexts-whether it is employment discrimination cases or derivative actions-may over time
erode the uniformity of the Uniform Code. Indeed, I can imagine a
whole bunch of other disputes that will be brought to the arbitration
forum as well.
All that I am saying is that the concept of arbitration has been
stretched by various means-by contract, as we discussed last time, by
proposed legislation (which may only be a straw in the wind), and by
new claims that are being brought within the arbitration clause without the parties having been aware of the degree of breadth that was
inherent in their contract. Inevitably, the nature of arbitration will
change under the pressure of both qualitative and quantitative expansion. Given that arbitration is being stretched out over distant terrain,
current thinking must focus on whether there have to be changes, subtle and otherwise, in the procedures used.
Having said that, I am going to turn the proceedings over to a real
authority on arbitration, Gus Katsoris.
PROF. KATSORIS: Thank you, Jack.
Jack mentioned the Uniform Code, and perhaps one size doesn't fit
all. It is an interesting observation because in the nearly fourteen
years since we've had the Code, arbitrations filed with the SROs have
grown from slightly over eight hundred to over six thousand per year.
Not only have the numbers grown dramatically, but the cases coming into arbitration are now far more complex. With this influx, many
problems of the courtroom have similarly surfaced.
The purpose of this Symposium is to discuss these issues frankly and
honestly.
I commend the New York Stock Exchange for initiating this dialogue. What we say here today not only has relevance to securities
arbitration, but in the future will be a blueprint for many other industries that are following in this alternative-dispute-resolution mode.
Let me emphasize one rule of protocol that was established at the
last meeting. We all feel very strongly about some of the issues, and
we have people here with opposing views. We don't want the discussion to get personal. We encourage frankness, but we are not here to
offend or embarrass anybody. We're here to put the issues on the
table with a view towards resolving them.
The format that was established at the last session and worked
rather smoothly is as follows: Each panelist will speak for about ten
or fifteen minutes on the particular subject, and then we'll open it up
for comments. When we are through with the comments, we will then
open it up for questions and answers.
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We'll try to limit the discussion of each topic to about an hour or so.

